A Vendor Whose Fix for a 9.8 Is Delete the Software
Murrelektronik's AAS Edge Client exposes an unauthenticated REST API on TCP 18000 that will accept writes to Asset Administration Shell data. There will be no patch; the advice is to remove it.
CERT@VDE published VDE-2026-108 on 6 October for CVE-2026-94293, a missing-authentication flaw (CWE-306) scored 9.8 in Murrelektronik's aas-edge-client, all versions.
The technical description is short because the problem is structural. The REST API binds to all network interfaces on TCP port 18000, requires no authentication, and accepts cross-origin requests from any origin. In CERT@VDE's words, an unauthenticated remote attacker can modify Asset Administration Shell submodel data via PATCH requests and can read all data exposed by the GET endpoints. The advisory notes that a malicious web page opened by a user on a network that can reach the device is sufficient.
Then the remediation section, which is unusual enough to quote: Murrelektronik GmbH will not provide a fix. The vendor states that the software was a reference implementation created solely for a trade-fair demonstrator and is no longer maintained. The recommended action is to discontinue use and remove any existing deployments as well as copies of the source code and container image. The reporter is credited as kta1kri.
Two things make this worth more than its advisory length. The Asset Administration Shell is the Industry 4.0 digital-twin standard, and submodel data is what MES and analytics layers treat as ground truth about a machine. Write access that leaves no trace doesn't leak information, it corrupts decisions made upstream — which is a harder failure to notice than a data breach.
The cross-origin detail deserves attention too. Accepting requests from any origin means an engineer browsing the web on a plant laptop can be the delivery mechanism, which bypasses the perimeter assumption that most OT network designs still rest on.
And then the honest lesson, which is not really about Murrelektronik. Demonstrator and reference code escapes into production routinely, because it works, it's available, and nobody labelled it. A remedy of "delete it" only functions if someone knows the container is running — and a container deployed for a demo two years ago is precisely the kind of thing no inventory records.